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The passage of Mill’s Utilitarianism that sets out the condition in which 
one pleasure has a superior quality than another stokes interpretive con-
troversy. According to the Lexical Interpretation, Mill takes one plea-
sure, P1, to be of a superior quality than another, P2, if, and only if, the 
smallest quantity of P1 is more valuable than any finite quantity of P2. 
This paper argues that, while the Lexical Interpretation may be sup-
ported with supplementary evidence, the passage itself does not rule out 
qualitative superiority without lexical dominance, as it only requires P1 
to be more valuable than any quantity of P2 that it is possible for some-
one to experience. Some will object that this concession to opponents of 
the Lexical Interpretation still renders Mill’s condition for qualitative 
superiority too demanding to be plausible. However, if Mill’s qualitative 
rankings apply to higher-order pleasures taken in modes of existence 
as such rather than to the pleasures of different activities chosen from 
within these modes, the objection loses much of its force. One upshot is 
that Mill may have more to contribute to debates in contemporary popu-
lation axiology than is usually acknowledged.
Keywords: John Stuart Mill; pleasure; qualitative hedonism; re-
pugnant conclusion; population axiology; utilitarianism.
1. Introduction
Mill’s Utilitarianism (1861) is generally taken to defend a hedonistic 
axiology according to which all and only pleasurable and painful expe-
riences are bearers of final (or non-instrumental) value and disvalue 
respectively (X: 209; Beaumont 2018a, 2019).1 It is also usually inter-
preted as rejecting a form of quantitative hedonism that takes the final 
value of a pleasure to be proportional to its “quantity”, where this quan-
titative value is constituted by the product of two sub-values: intensity 
1 All references to Mill are to volume and page number of his (1963–1991).
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and duration (X: 213, 236; Crisp 1997: 32; Wilson 1990: 277–8). This 
is replaced with a form of qualitative hedonism that takes a pleasure’s 
final value to be a function of its “quality” as well as its “quantity” (X: 
211). Since Mill proceeds as if he accepts quantitative hedonism’s con-
ception of quantitative value, his qualitative hedonism is then taken 
to imply that the final value of pleasurable experiences is a function of 
their quality as well as their intensity and duration (Donner 1991: 41). 
On this view, the final (dis)value of a life is an aggregative function of 
the final value of its pleasures and the final disvalue of its pains, and 
the final (dis)value of a set (or population) of lives is an aggregative 
function of the final (dis)value of each individual life it contains. This 
paper treats the preceding interpretive framework as a working as-
sumption and as its point of inception.
One interpretive controversy that arises therefrom concerns the 
veracity of the Lexical Interpretation of Mill’s qualitative hedonism, 
which takes it to imply that one pleasure, P1, is of a superior qual-
ity than another, P2, if, and only if, the smallest quantity of P1 bears 
more final value than any finite quantity of P2 (proponents include: 
Brink 1997: 153; Crisp 1997: 40; and Riley 2003: 418). In contemporary 
population axiology, Derek Parfit also seems to endorse the Lexical In-
terpretation, and to intimate that it allows Mill to evaluate the aggre-
gated pleasures of distinct populations in such a way as to avoid the:
“Repugnant Conclusion”: ceteris paribus, given two possible substantial 
populations, A and B, of a numerical size nA and nB respectively, such that 
the members of A enjoy the highest quality of life possible but those of B a 
quality of life that merely crosses the minimal threshold to make it worth 
living, the existence of B may still be of greater final value provided that nB 
is sufficiently larger than nA for the aggregate welfare of B’s population to 
outweigh that of A. (2004: 9–11, 17–20; 1984: 413–4)2
However, while many—but by no means all (Arrhenius, Ryberg, Tän-
nsjö 2017: 2.8)—would see this as an advantage, it has not drawn many 
population axiologists to Mill’s position (including Parfit himself, al-
though see his 2016). Aside from an aversion to hedonism as such, the 
main reason for this may lie in the thought that the (supposedly) lexi-
cal character of Mill’s qualitative hedonism could only generate this ad-
vantage at the cost of generating what we can refer to as the:
Extreme Conclusion: ceteris paribus, given one possible population, C, of a 
numerical size, nC, whose members enjoy a good quality of life, and one pos-
sible person, d, who enjoys a quality of life that is of a marginally superior 
quality, the existence of d would be of greater final value than the exis-
tence of C regardless of how much greater nC is than 1 (see also Arrhenius, 
Ryberg, Tännsjö 2017: 2.1.1, 2.2).3
2 Unlike Parfit’s exposition, this one builds the final explanatory (‘provided’) 
clause into the conclusion itself (for the sake of convenience). It should also be noted 
that this reasoning assumes that the hedonist will cash out the notion of ‘quality of 
life’ in terms of the final (hedonic) value thereof.
3 Some may also worry about the way in which a lexical qualitative hedonism will 
evaluate pains, but an examination of such concerns must be left for another study.
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Nevertheless, this Extreme Conclusion objection at the level of inter-
personal evaluation—pertaining to the comparison of the final value of 
the lives of distinct people or beings (including sets thereof)—has been 
underexplored by Mill scholars as such (although see Miller 2010: 58).4
The main reason for this seems to be that most Mill scholars think 
that if the Lexical Interpretation were true, his qualitative hedonism 
would be falsified by an analogously ‘extreme’ implication at the ante-
cedent intra-personal level of evaluation—pertaining to the comparison 
of the final value of different ways in which one person (or being) could 
live his or life—namely, that it can never be optimal for an individual to 
sacrifice hedonic quality for hedonic quantity (Anderson 1991: 9; Crisp 
1997: 41; Hauskeller 2011: 433–5; Schaupp 2013: 275–6).5 For example, 
many will intuit that, ceteris paribus, while Life 1 below is hedonically 
preferable to Life 2, Life 3 is hedonically preferable to either: 
Life 1: with an abundance of ‘higher quality’ pleasure in books but no 
‘lower quality’ pleasure in dessert.
Life 2: with no ‘higher quality’ pleasure in books and an abundance of 
‘lower quality’ pleasure in dessert.
Life 3: with slightly less of the ‘higher quality’ pleasure in books than in 
Life 1 and as much of the ‘lower quality’ pleasure in dessert as 
Life 2 (adapted from Anderson 1991: 9).
Supposing the Lexical Interpretation were true, then, one might take 
this to show that, while Mill’s distinction between quality and quantity 
is intuitive in terms of helping to explain why Life 1 is preferable to the 
comparatively ‘repugnant’ Life 2,6 the requirement that quality lexi-
cally dominate quantity is too strong—or ‘extreme’—to be plausible.7 
Moreover, with this conclusion at hand, it has been claimed that the 
4 Those who doubt the commensurability of Mill’s position with those of more 
recent philosophers may wish to consult Beaumont (2018b).
5 ‘Antecedent’ because this is the level upon which Mill focuses when he offers 
the condition for qualitative superiority (X: 211, see below).
6 For the distinction between ‘repugnance’ at the inter-personal and intra-
personal levels, see Arrhenius & Rabinowicz (2015: 226–8) and Parfit (2016: 119).
7 Anderson also concludes that Mill’s appeal to ‘quality’ is an appeal to the value 
of something other than pleasure, and thus illicit given his official commitment 
to hedonism (1991: 10). Non-hedonists may be correct to think it is necessary to 
appeal to non-hedonic value-bearers to explain the comparative value of such lives 
(Schaupp 2013: 267; Skorupksi 1989: 299–303). However, this paper assumes that 
Mill is a consistent hedonist (see Beaumont 2019). Moreover, since it is designed 
to explore Mill’s qualitative hedonism rather than question hedonism as such, it 
will assume that when two lives differ in final value, Mill is right to think it is in 
virtue of differences in the value of their pleasures. This much is compatible with the 
pleasures being valuable because they are pleasant (full hedonism) or because they 
are made valuable by non-hedonic value-makers (partial hedonism) (Crisp 1997: 26). 
The full hedonist view is also compatible with internalist or externalist conceptions 
of pleasure (Miller 2010: 35). This paper remains agnostic regarding these other 
debates concerning the character of Mill’s hedonism (but see Beaumont (2019) for 
further discussion).
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Lexical Interpretation should be rejected on grounds of interpretive 
charity (Saunders 2016: 504; West 2004: 63–4).
This paper will re-examine the key passage of Utilitarianism in 
which Mill explains when, and why, one pleasure has a superior qual-
ity than another, and provide a technical taxonomy of some of the inter-
pretive moves that must be made to defend the Lexical Interpretation 
(Section 2). It also defends two of these moves by arguing that the Lexi-
cal Interpretation is correct to interpret Mill as (1) offering a necessary, 
as well as a sufficient, condition for qualitative superiority (Section 3); 
and (2) taking the qualitative superiority of P1 to P2 to imply that the 
smallest quantity of P1 bears more final value than any finite quantity 
of P2 that a competent judge’s “nature is capable of” (X: 211) (Section 
4). However, without denying the truth of the Lexical Interpretation, 
the paper notes that it cannot rest on the passage in question alone, 
as any finite quantity of which a competent judge’s nature is capable 
is less than any finite quantity as such.8 In consequence, the strongest 
conclusion that the passage supports in isolation is that the smallest 
quantity of P1 must bear more final value than any (finite) quantity of 
P2 that could be experienced in a single life (Lifetime Interpretation). 
Of course, given the way that the intra-personal version of the Ex-
treme Conclusion objection is framed above, in terms of the choice be-
tween Lives 1–3, Mill would remain vulnerable to it given the Lifetime 
Interpretation. However, Section 5 of the paper argues that Mill’s illus-
tration of qualitative superiority with reference to different capacity-
based “modes of existence” (X: 213) indicates that the objection may 
be ill-framed. Since modes of existence contain sets of pleasures (and 
pains), such as pleasures taken in books and dessert, pleasures taken 
in these sets of pleasures can be viewed as higher-order pleasures (or 
enjoyment) taken in the mode of existence as such.9 In consequence, if 
Mill’s qualitative rankings are taken to apply at the higher-order level 
(Inter-Modal Interpretation), the supposed optimality of the trade-off 
between pleasure in books and dessert (as previously framed in terms 
of the choice of Life 3 over Life 1) would not challenge his position. 
Given the Inter-Modal Interpretation, this optimality could be re-
framed in terms of an (intra-modal) preference for greater variety in 
the lower-order pleasures one experiences within a given mode of exis-
tence, rather than an occasional preference for lower over higher quality 
8 As highlighted by the possibility of inter-personal aggregation.
9 West (2004: 64, 67, 69) also distinguishes between “first-order” and “second-
order” pleasures, on the one hand, and links the latter to Mill’s “modes” or “manner[s] 
of existence” (X: 211, 213), on the other. While his use of these terms is perfectly 
legitimate, it is slightly different to the higher- and lower-order distinction in this 
paper. For example, whereas he seems to use “second-order pleasures” to refer to 
momentary pleasures taken in one’s “self-image” as one enjoys a first-order pleasure 
in conformity therewith, this paper takes higher-order pleasures to consist of the 
extended pleasure or enjoyment of sets of momentary lower-order pleasures over 
time.
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pleasures as such. Moreover, this much is compatible with it remaining 
plausible that the value of the smallest quantity of the higher-order 
pleasure taken in a mode of existence incorporating reading outweighs 
that of the maximal quantity of pleasure that could be taken in a life de-
void of the capacity for reading but replete with pleasure in dessert. In 
consequence, when combined with the Inter-Modal Interpretation, the 
Lifetime Interpretation (if not also the Lexical Interpretation) renders 
it plausible—as opposed to absurdly ‘extreme’—to think that relations 
of qualitative superiority could emerge between the higher-order plea-
sures taken in those two modes of existence. Moreover, since the Life-
time Interpretation of Mill’s qualitative hedonism does not automati-
cally require Mill to embrace the Repugnant Conclusion, it raises the 
possibility that he found a way to navigate between ‘repugnance’ and 
‘extremity’ at the inter-personal level that has yet to be fully explored.
2. Mill on quality and quantity
Mill sets out the condition for the qualitative superiority of one plea-
sure over another as follows:
[A] If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what 
makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as pleasure, except 
its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. [B] Of two 
pleasures if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of 
both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obliga-
tion to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. [C] If one of the two 
is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above 
the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a 
greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the 
other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascrib-
ing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing 
quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. (X: 211)
The relationship between Passage A, on the one hand, and Passages 
B and C, on the other, is confusing for several reasons. Firstly, while 
Passage A says that “there is but one possible answer” to its question, 
Passages B and C provide what look like different, and potentially con-
flicting, criteria. According to the interpretation that can be referred to 
as B-Sufficiency, Mill’s one answer is given by Passage B, thus imply-
ing that it provides a sufficient condition for qualitative superiority. It 
then takes the more demanding condition constituted by the combina-
tion of Passage B and C to be sufficient for one pleasure to have much 
greater quality than another (Miller 2010: 58; Saunders 2011: 188–90; 
Schaupp 2013: 268; Schmidt-Petri 2003: 102–4). In contrast, according 
to the interpretation that can be referred to as C-Sufficiency, Passage B 
provides a necessary but insufficient condition for qualitative superior-
ity, and thus Passages B and C provide the sufficient condition jointly 
(Anderson 1991: 9; Crisp 1997: 29; Hauskeller 2013: 433; Riley 2003: 
410; Riley 2008: 63; Sturgeon 2010: 1711).10
10 While this interpretation is labelled as ‘C-Sufficiency’ for short, it is important 
to emphasize that it takes Mill’s condition to incorporate the material from Passage 
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A further interpretive puzzle pertaining to Passages B and C is 
whether Mill’s sufficient condition for qualitative superiority is also a 
necessary condition thereof. The interpretations that can be referred 
to as B-Necessity and C-Necessity respectively both answer in the af-
firmative, with the former appending this claim to B-Sufficiency (Miller 
2010: 58) and the latter to C-Sufficiency (Anderson 1991: 9; Crisp 1997: 
29; Riley 2003: 410; Riley 2008: 63).11 In contrast, the interpretation 
that can be referred to as Anti-Necessity rejects both B-Necessity and 
C-Necessity on the grounds that Passage B or C respectively would only 
have committed Mill to the corresponding positions if he had rephrased 
them in a biconditional form (Schmidt-Petri 2003: 102–4; 2006: 166).12 
The next two sections of the paper argue that Anti-Necessity can be 
set aside (Section 3), and that C-Sufficiency and Necessity should be 
endorsed instead (Section 4).
3. An argument against anti-necessity
One argument for C-Sufficiency is that, since Passage B only purports 
to provide a criterion for judging which of two pleasures, P1 and P2, 
is the “more desirable,” and all agree that if P1 and P2 have the same 
qualitative value, P1 could be more desirable than P2 in virtue of supe-
rior quantitative value alone, the passage cannot provide a sufficient 
condition for qualitative superiority (Riley 2003: 412). Thus, the ar-
gument implies, to generate a sufficient condition Passage B must be 
supplemented with Passage C.
One reply on behalf of B-Sufficiency is that when Mill uses the 
clause “except its being greater in amount” in Passage A, following 
“what makes one pleasure [P1] more valuable than another [P2]”, he is 
not simply asserting that the criteria for qualitative difference must be 
distinct from the criteria for quantitative difference, but also indicat-
ing that the criteria given in Passage B should be read as presupposing 
that the quantities of P1 and P2 are already held fixed as equal (Miller 
2010: 57–8). In consequence, the response maintains, once this implicit 
presupposition is read into Passage B, the greater value of P1 as plea-
sure can only be explained by its superior quality, and hence Passage B 
can provide a sufficient condition after all (cf. Riley 2008: 62–3). 
In the discussion that follows it will be important to distinguish 
between Mill’s truth and justification conditions, which is to say the 
conditions in which he takes it to be the case that P1 is of a superior 
quality to P2, on the one hand, and the conditions in which he deems it 
justifiable to believe that this is so, on the other. The preceding defence 
B as well, as the latter includes a “moral obligation” clause that is not explicitly 
restated in Passage C (see footnote 13).
11 Miller seems to endorse B-Necessity when he says of the condition in Passage 
B that “its satisfaction is all that is required” (2010: 58).
12 Schmidt-Petri only directs this objection at C-Necessity. However, ceteris 
paribus, its validity would undermine B-Necessity as well.
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of B-Sufficiency suggests that the best way to do this is to cash it out in 
terms of its attribution to Mill of the following claims:
Ontological B-Sufficiency: if a quantity, x, of P1 is more valuable as pleasure 
than the same quantity, x, of P2, P1 is of a superior quality to P2.
Epistemic B-Sufficiency: if all or almost all competent judges prefer a quan-
tity, x, of P1 as pleasure to the same quantity, x, of P2, the belief that P1 is of 
a superior quality to P2 is justifiable.13
This also allows B-Necessity to be cashed out in terms of the attribu-
tion to Mill of the corresponding pair of claims, Ontological B-Necessity 
and Epistemic B-Necessity, consisting of the preceding claims but with 
the direction of the conditionals reversed (see below).
In contrast, in the case of C-Sufficiency the corresponding theses 
would be as follows:
Ontological C-Sufficiency: if any quantity of P1, however small, is more valu-
able as pleasure than any quantity of P2 “which their nature is capable of” 
(Passage C), P1 is of a superior quality as pleasure to P2.
Epistemic C-Sufficiency: if all or almost all competent judges prefer any 
quantity of P1, however small, as pleasure to any quantity of P2 “which their 
nature is capable of”, the belief that P1 is of a superior quality to P2 as plea-
sure is justifiable.
As before, this allows C-Necessity to be cashed out in terms of the at-
tribution to Mill of the corresponding pair of claims, Ontological C-Ne-
cessity and Epistemic C-Necessity, consisting of the preceding claims 
but with the direction of the conditionals reversed (cf. Riley 2003: 418; 
Schmidt-Petri 2006: 166).
When formalized thus, it is possible to reduce, say, the epistemic 
dimension of the debate between B-Sufficiency and C-Sufficiency to 
the question of whether Mill would endorse Epistemic B-Sufficiency.14 
Likewise, the debate over Anti-Necessity reduces to the question of 
whether it would be legitimate to: (1) infer Mill’s commitment to Onto-
logical and Epistemic B-Necessity  from his commitment to Ontological 
and Epistemic B-Sufficiency respectively; and (2) infer Mill’s commit-
ment to Ontological and Epistemic C-Necessity from his commitment 
to Ontological and Epistemic C-Sufficiency respectively. In the remain-
der of this section, each of these inferences will be examined in turn.
Firstly, given the assumption that Mill is a qualitative hedonist, it 
should be uncontroversial that if one adopts Ontological B-Sufficiency, 
one must also adopt:
13 These formulations oversimplify somewhat by abstracting from the “moral 
obligation” clause (Passage B) and the “discontent” clause (Passage C) (Anderson 
1991: 9), the examination of which are left to another study. They also employ the 
“all or almost all” competent judges of (X: 211) rather than the mere “majority” 
thereof of (X: 213), but not much hangs on this for the argument that follows (see 
footnote 16).
14 Note that the advocate of B-Sufficiency will take Mill to endorse Epistemic 
C-Sufficiency, whilst maintaining that C-Sufficiency as such is mistaken for taking 
Mill to reject Epistemic B-Sufficiency.
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Ontological B-Necessity: if P1 is of a superior quality to P2, a quantity, x, of P1 
is more valuable as pleasure than the same quantity, x, of P2.
After all, given a commitment to Ontological B-Sufficiency, and its at-
tendant assumption that it is possible to compare and commensurate 
the hedonic quantities of pleasures of different hedonic qualities, Mill 
could only reject Ontological B-Necessity by denying that the qualities 
of pleasures affect their final value. However, that would be to abandon 
qualitative hedonism in favour of quantitative hedonism by implying 
that if P1 and P2 are equal in quantity, they are of equal final value.
Secondly, the epistemic transitions from endorsing either Epis-
temic B-Sufficiency, on the one hand, or Epistemic C-Sufficiency, on 
the other, to endorsing the following theses respectively should also be 
straightforward:
Epistemic B-Necessity: if the belief that P1 is of a superior quality to P2 is 
justifiable, all or almost all competent judges prefer a quantity, x, of P1 as 
pleasure to the same quantity, x, of P2.
Epistemic C-Necessity: if the belief that P1 is of a superior quality to P2 as 
pleasure is justifiable, all or almost all competent judges prefer any quan-
tity of P1, however small, as pleasure to any quantity of P2 “which their 
nature is capable of” (Passage C).
Of course, in each case the obvious objection will be that Mill could take 
an individual’s hedonic beliefs to be justifiable when these beliefs defer 
to the preferences of all or almost all competent judges, without taking 
the beliefs to be unjustifiable insofar as they defy that verdict.15 For 
instance, one might think that Mill posits another mode of justifica-
tion besides epistemic deference to the verdict of the competent super-
majority, that is compatible with epistemic defiance thereof. However, 
shortly after Passage A–C, Mill rules out this possibility—by ruling 
out a justification for such epistemic defiance—when he declares that 
“[f]rom this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can 
be no appeal” (X: 213).16
This leaves the final controversy to be considered, over whether a 
justification for taking Passage A–C to support the attribution of On-
tological C-Sufficiency to Mill would justify attributing the following to 
him as well:
Ontological C-Necessity: if P1 is of a superior quality as pleasure to P2, any 
quantity of P1, however small, is more valuable as pleasure than any quan-
tity of P2 “which their nature is capable of” (Passage C),
15 Such deference would not entail altering one’s preference for P1 over P2 when 
almost all competent judges prefer P2 to P1, but rather refraining from taking one’s 
preference to justify a belief that P1 is qualitatively superior to P2.
16 A possible objection is that formulating the epistemic theses in terms of a 
“majority” of competent judges (see footnote 13) would have invalidated these 
transitions when: (1) the judges’ preferences generate a tied qualitative verdict 
vis-à-vis two pleasures; and (2) it is nevertheless justifiable to believe that one is 
qualitatively superior. However, Mill gives no indication that (2) could be true given 
(1), even though it would not require an illicit counter-majoritarian appeal. Moreover, 
even if sound, the objection would not invalidate the transitions in standard cases in 
which there is a majority verdict.
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Of course, it would be “a mistake in propositional logic” (Schmidt-Petri: 
2006: 170) to take the former to entail the latter directly.17 However, 
the validity of the inference does not depend upon Mill’s introduction of 
an explicit biconditional in Passages B & C as it is provided implicitly 
by Passage A’s claim that Passage B or Passages B & C provide(s) the 
“one possible answer” (emphasis added) to the question of when differ-
ences of quality obtain. After all, as Mill acknowledges while discuss-
ing causation in the System of Logic, if Q is the only condition that will 
suffice for R, Q is also necessary for R, and hence the satisfaction of the 
only sufficient condition for R can be inferred from R itself (VII: 438).18 
In other words, given Passage A, the sufficient condition for qualitative 
superiority provided by Passage B or Passage B & C must also be a 
necessary condition thereof, and the Logic shows that Mill recognized 
the validity of this kind of inference. In consequence, the grounds of 
the debate shift to which of B-Sufficiency or C-Sufficiency should be 
endorsed in the first place.
4. An argument for c-necessity
An advocate of B-Sufficiency (and hence, given the argument of Section 
3, B-Necessity) might object to C-Sufficiency (and hence C-Necessity) 
on the grounds that if Mill had taken his “one possible answer” (em-
phasis added) to be given by Passages B & C jointly, he would have 
combined them into a single clause. However, this objection overlooks 
Mill’s criticisms of Bentham’s “intricate and involved style”, which Mill 
claims to have rendered Bentham’s “later writings books for the stu-
dent only, not the general reader”: 
He [Bentham] could not bear, for the sake of clearness and the reader’s 
ease, to say, as ordinary men are content to do, a little more than the truth 
in one sentence, and correct it in the next. (X: 114–5) 
This passage is also grist to the mill of C-Sufficiency as it suggests that 
Mill could also view Passage B as a “sentence” containing “a little more 
than the truth,” and thus requiring correction “in the next.”19
That Passage C should be read this way is also suggested by a diary 
entry from 1854, in which Mill claims that: 
[C*] Quality as well as quantity of happiness is to be considered; less of a 
higher kind is preferable to more of a lower. [B*] The test of quality is the 
preference given by those who are acquainted with both. (XXVII: 663)
Discussions of this passage tend to focus on whether it supports the 
Lexical Interpretation directly, by implying that it can never be opti-
17 The following argument would also ground the three preceding inferences.
18 That is, Mill notes that the causal case in which Q is the “only possible cause” 
of R is also a logical case of Q if, and only if, R (VII: 438). Similarly, for Mill, seeing 
α is not only sufficient for proof of α’s visibility, but also necessary qua constituting 
the only form of proof possible (X: 234).
19 Note that in On Liberty Mill also formulates his “one very simple principle” 
cumulatively across two sentences, with an essential ‘civilizational’ scope restrictor 
added in the second (XVIII: 223).
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mal to sacrifice quality for quantity (Riley 2003: 415; Saunders 2011: 
195; Schmidt-Petri 2006: 176). However, the passage could also sup-
port the Lexical Interpretation indirectly through what it reveals about 
the genealogy of Passages B and C. On the one hand, since Passage B* 
has a similar content to Passage B, and Passage C* has a similar con-
tent to Passage C, but the diary entry reverses their order, we cannot 
simply take Passage B to provide Mill’s sufficient condition because it 
is prior to Passage C. On the other, since Passage B* elaborates and 
clarifies the condition introduced in Passage C*, the genealogical origin 
of Passage C also supports the claim that its purpose is to elaborate 
and clarify the condition introduced in Passage B. In consequence, an 
examination of Passage C* and B* weakens the case for B-Sufficiency, 
and strengthens that for C-Necessity, even before we consider how far 
the meaning of Passages C* & B* aligns with that of Passages B & C.  
To see the significance of the point, we need to view the diary pas-
sage in a broader context. In Utilitarianism Mill makes clear that hap-
piness consists of a positive balance of pleasure over pain, but that if 
this positive balance is not somehow predicated upon higher quality 
pleasures, it can only be considered to be what the Logic describes as 
happiness in the “humble” as opposed to the “higher” sense of the term 
(VIII: 952; see also X: 211, Beaumont 2018a: 454). In consequence, by 
maintaining that “less of a higher kind” of happiness “is preferable to 
more of a lower”, without adding any further quantitative qualifica-
tions (Beaumont 2019: 559 n.26; Riley 2003: 415; cf. Saunders 2011: 
195), the diary entry supports the Lexical Interpretation by implying 
that the value of the higher quality pleasures that help to constitute 
the higher form of happiness, lexically dominates the value of the lower 
quality pleasures that help to constitute the lower form of happiness. 
While defending C-Necessity, Jonathan Riley argues that Passage C 
should be read in the same lexical manner as the diary entry, by cashing 
out the quantity “which their nature is capable of” clause as “any finite 
amount” (2003: 418, emphasis added). In response, some object that, 
since some such finite quantities would transcend the capacities of a sin-
gle person to experience them—for example, even at the intra-personal 
level one can imagine a quantity achieved by extending its duration 
into an afterlife, or by ratcheting up its intensity to a level requiring a 
super-human constitution (see also Crisp 1997: 23–5)—the “which their 
nature is capable of” clause introduces an implicit quantitative qualifi-
cation that Riley’s move ignores (Miller 2010: 57–8; Saunders 2011: 193; 
Sturgeon 2010: 1711 n.29). However, since the genealogy of the diary 
entry suggests that Passage C should be read as elaborating on Pas-
sage B, on the one hand, and the diary entry’s condition for qualitative 
superiority is much closer to that provided by C-Necessity, on the other, 
the most that the preceding objection could be claimed plausibly—as 
opposed to definitively—to show is that C-Necessity should not be ex-
tended into the Lexical Interpretation. For example, one might claim 
that, while the diary entry presents a lexical requirement for qualita-
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tive superiority, this was simply the original seed from which the posi-
tion that Mill articulates in Passages B & C grew, and it is the weaker 
condition for qualitative superiority found therein, which he opted to 
publish, that constitutes his considered position.
Without such an extension into the Lexical Interpretation, C-Neces-
sity alone would imply that, for P1 to be of a superior quality to P2, the 
smallest quantity of P1 must bear more final value than any quantity 
of P2 of which the competent judges are capable of—which is to say, at 
least a lifetime’s worth of P2—without requiring it to outvalue any finite 
quantity of P2 as such (the Lifetime Interpretation). To illustrate, con-
sider Mill’s famous comparison of the superior quality of “mental” plea-
sures, unique to the human mode of existence, and the “bodily” ones, to 
which a swine’s mode of existence is entirely restricted (X: 211–3). In this 
case, C-Necessity implies that, ceteris paribus, a life with the smallest 
possible quantity of mental pleasure consistent with the human mode 
of existence bears more final value than a ‘swinish’ life that is replete 
with bodily pleasure but devoid of such mental pleasure. In contrast, the 
Lexical Interpretation generates the stronger implication that, ceteris 
paribus, the former life bears more final value than any number of lives 
of the second kind (Beaumont 2019: 571–5). In consequence, the answer 
to the question of whether C-Necessity should be construed in terms of 
the Lifetime Interpretation, or extended into the Lexical Interpretation, 
may be important for understanding the exact implications of Mill’s axi-
ology for his utilitarian animal ethics (Section 6).
5. Hedonic quality and modes of existence
Some deem the Lexical Interpretation to be uncharitable to Mill be-
cause the conditions for qualitative superiority it attributes to him 
are too demanding—or ‘extreme’ in their implications—to be plausible 
(Saunders 2016: 504; West 2004: 63–4). Since it could be claimed that 
this objection continues to apply in the case of C-Necessity alone—and 
thus the Lifetime Interpretation—its weaker requirement notwith-
standing, it is worth outlining why its requirement may be much less 
demanding than it first appears.
Sometimes Mill writes about ‘pleasures’ of different qualities as if 
we can choose between them on a day-to-day basis. In these cases, he 
seems to use ‘pleasure’ to refer to short-term pleasurable experiences 
(X: 212–3), including the experience of activities (X: 235). However, 
his key examples of differences of hedonic quality involve comparisons 
of the pleasantness or enjoyableness of different experiential “modes 
of existence” (X: 213). For example, in addition to his comparison of 
the human and swinish modes mentioned above, he also compares the 
modes of the “intelligent human being” and the “fool”, the “instruct-
ed person” and the “ignoramus”, along with the mode of the person of 
“[moral] feeling and conscience” as contrasted with that of the person 
who is purely “selfish and base” (X: 211–2).
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As thus construed, a mode of existence consists of the experience of 
the multifarious potentialities born of the possession and exercise of a 
set of capacities over time. Given the taxonomy of experiences in Mill’s 
Logic, different modes will include different kinds and levels of “sen-
sations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions” (VII: 64). Moreover, some 
modes will require specific activities to exercise and sustain the capaci-
ties upon which they are predicated (X: 213). However, in the case of 
most human beings at least, a mode of existence will be much broader 
than any flash of consciousness or activity it incorporates (X: 215), in 
virtue of embodying the higher-order experience of experiencing many 
sensations, thoughts, emotions, and volitions over time, along with the 
sense of self that emerges in the process (XXXI: 138). 
This much suggests that Mill could deem some of these higher-order 
experiences, consisting of sets of (lower-order) experiences of pleasures, 
to be higher-order pleasures that transcend the sum of their parts. Af-
ter all, in the Logic Mill introduces the notion of “mental chemistry” 
to explain how comparatively complex feelings or experiences can be 
generated, as opposed to simply constituted, by sets or combinations of 
comparatively simple feelings or experiences (VIII: 854). If this were 
correct, Mill’s focus on modes of existence would be explicable in terms 
of the fact that it is ultimately the higher-order pleasures taken therein 
to which his hedonism assigns its qualitative rankings (the Inter-Mod-
al Interpretation). 
To illustrate, consider the following passage from Utilitarianism: 
A state of exalted pleasure lasts only moments, or in some cases, and with 
some intermissions, hours or days, and is the occasional brilliant flash of en-
joyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of this the philosophers who 
have taught that happiness is the end of life were as fully aware as those 
who taunt them. The happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture; 
but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, 
many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over 
the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more 
from life than it is capable of bestowing. (X: 215)
One way to read this passage is to take the “brilliant flash of enjoy-
ment” to refer to a higher quality pleasure than that embodied in the 
“permanent and steady flame”. However, the alternative proposed here 
is to read Mill as ascribing a high-level quality to the “enjoyment” of 
the “permanent and steady flame”, and to take the “flash” to represent 
a brief increase in its intensity. On this view, the high-level quality is 
ascribed to an extended enjoyment of—or higher-order pleasure taken 
in—an “existence” with “moments” of “rapture”, “many and various 
pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over the passive” 
etc.20 Since Mill also describes this existence as including only “few and 
20 Crisp (1997: 27–8) notes that Mill’s hedonism can only be understood 
properly when the term ‘pleasure’ is taken to include ‘enjoyment’. Moreover, he also 
observes correctly that we can enjoy extended experiences that include some pain or 
suffering, such as struggling to climb a mountain. In consequence, one might take 
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transitory pains”, the quantitative preponderance of pleasure over pain 
it entails makes it a happy one (X: 210). Moreover, this is the “higher” 
form of happiness that Mill refers to in the Logic (VIII: 952) because 
the said preponderance incorporates higher-order pleasures of a rela-
tively high quality (X: 211–2). In consequence, this account also aligns 
with the diary entry’s reference to the “quality as well as quantity of 
happiness” (XXVII: 663; emphasis added) because it explains how the 
quality of the higher-order pleasures taken in a mode of existence can 
pass over into the quality of the happiness of that mode once its pains 
are also taken into account.21
Importantly, once C-Necessity is combined with the Inter-Modal In-
terpretation its condition for qualitative superiority becomes far less 
contentious at the intra-personal level. People may disagree over the 
size of the smallest possible durational quantity that P1 would have to 
take for it to constitute a genuine experience of, say, the human mode 
of existence, as opposed to an experience of nothing more than one 
of the fleeting sensations, thoughts, or activities that are performed 
therein. However, regardless of whether one judges the correct answer 
to be a day, a week, or longer, it would not be possible to refute Mill by 
claiming that a lifetime of swinish pleasure is more valuable than the 
pleasure of a snapshot of the consciousness of a human being (suppos-
ing this is actually true),22 as the quality of the pleasure of the human 
mode of existence would not be captured through such a comparison.23 
Moreover, nor would it be possible to refute Mill by insisting that the 
more cerebral nature of the pleasure of reading is insufficient to ensure 
that it is always more valuable than the comparatively sensual plea-
sure of eating dessert, irrespective of how reading-rich and dessert-
poor one happens to be at the time (cf. Anderson 1991: 9; Crisp 1997: 
40–1). After all, if the pleasures of activities are indexed to the pleasure 
of the mode of existence in which they are undertaken—compare the 
this to show that higher-order pleasures should be construed as pleasures taken in 
sets of lower-order pleasures and pains. However, that interpretive option has been 
rejected here for several reasons. Firstly, not all pains are enjoyable. Secondly, those 
which are enjoyable can be reconceived as pleasures using Mill’s notion of complex 
ideas (VII: 57). And thirdly, Mill uses ‘happiness’ to encompass sets of pleasures 
and pains in which the former pre-dominate over the latter. In consequence, to take 
the higher-order pleasures, of which the Inter-Modal Interpretation claims ‘quality’ 
rankings to be predicated, to include pains, would be to muddy the waters between 
happiness and higher quality pleasure. In contrast, the version of the Inter-Modal 
Interpretation presented here clarifies the distinction whilst explaining the tightness 
of the connection between higher quality pleasure and higher quality happiness (see 
below).
21 Hoag (1987: 418) refers to Mill’s conception of happiness as a “higher-order 
[…] end of life”.
22 See also the example offered by Miller (2010: 58).
23 In consequence, to employ the technical terms employed by Griffin (1986: 
83–5), when the smallest possible unit of a pleasure-type is sufficiently large, the 
distinction between “trumping” and “discontinuity” may become less significant.
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mindset of Socrates eating dessert to that of a pig doing so—the dif-
ference between the pleasure of reading and eating dessert within the 
same of mode existence may be one of mere quantity, with the relative 
values depending upon the context of the choice.24
At an interpretive level, the preceding would also explain why Mill 
is more concerned to deny the existence of voluntary descent from a 
higher to a lower mode of existence than to insist that all highly culti-
vated people with strength of will are motivated to devote every drop 
of their time and energy to the most demanding intellectual, aesthetic, 
or moral activities (X: 213). That said, it is no doubt significant that 
one route to such descent could lie through choosing the likes of dessert 
over reading consistently, thus failing to sustain the capacities upon 
which the advanced mode is predicated. As a result, the Inter-Modal 
Interpretation can also explain Mill’s occasional practice of referring to 
(intra-modal) activities as higher and lower pleasures, in terms of their 
role as indicators of the quality of the modes that people occupy, or to 
which these activities may lead them to fall or rise.
6. Conclusion—Looking ahead
This paper has provided a defence of C-Necessity, and thereby argued 
that Mill’s qualitative hedonism should be interpreted in terms of the 
Lifetime Interpretation or the Lexical Interpretation. The choice be-
tween the two must ultimately be settled with reference to Mill’s broad-
er corpus. All that has been claimed here is that you cannot get to the 
Lexical Interpretation via (X: 211) alone.
The paper has also argued that, given the combination of the Life-
time and Inter-Modal Interpretations, the objection that Mill’s condi-
tion for qualitative superiority is too ‘extreme’ or demanding loses much 
of its force at the intra-personal level. However, in doing so, the intent 
was not to suggest that this gives the Lifetime Interpretation much of 
an advantage, as the Lexical Interpretation can also be combined with 
the Inter-Modal Interpretation. Moreover, turning back to population 
axiology, advocates of the Lexical Interpretation may argue that, once 
it is combined with the Inter-Modal Interpretation, its extra vestigial 
demandingness gives it an interpretive advantage over the Lifetime 
Interpretation. After all, they may claim, it is the Lexical Interpreta-
tion alone that can explain how Mill’s qualitative hedonism can avoid 
certain variants of the Repugnant Conclusion that prompted him to 
embrace qualitative hedonism in the first place. For example, they may 
argue that it is less plausible to interpret Mill as believing that the 
smallest quantity of the pleasure of the human mode is more valuable 
than that of the fullest pleasure taken in one swinish life only, than to 
interpret him as taking the former pleasure to outvalue that taken in 
any finite number of swinish lives (see Beaumont 2019: 571–5).
24 Recall that Mill refers to “happiness” as “an existence made up of […] many 
and various pleasures” (X: 215). See also West (2004: 62) and Saunders (2016: 515).
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In consequence, it is important to note that it is not (actually) self-
evident that the Lifetime Interpretation would preclude such a judg-
ment. After all, the Lifetime Interpretation can deny that Mill takes 
relations of qualitative superiority to entail lexical dominance, without 
denying that he takes any relations of qualitative superiority to rise to 
that level. On this view, Mill could take some qualitative differences to 
be far more significant than others, but for this to be manifest only once 
we cross the threshold from intra-personal to inter-personal evalua-
tion. One reason this is important is that it is also far from self-evident 
that the Lexical Interpretation has an interpretive advantage at the 
inter-personal level when it comes to Mill’s other axiological compari-
sons of modes of existence.
Recall that Mill also posits relations of qualitative superiority in 
the pleasures taken in the following modes: that of the intelligent being 
over the fool, that of the instructed person over the ignoramus, and that 
of the person of feeling and conscience over that of the person who is 
selfish and base.  In the case of each of these pairs, is it more plausible 
to take Mill to believe that his qualitative superiority claim entails only 
that the smallest quantity of the former bears more final value than an 
entire lifetime of the latter (Lifetime Interpretation), or that he also 
takes it to entail that the smallest quantity of the former bears more 
value than that taken in any finite number of such lives (Lexical Inter-
pretation)? When the choice between the Lifetime and Lexical Inter-
pretation is framed thus, it is apparent that the Lexical Interpretation 
will be more prone to generate ‘extreme’ results, of doubtful consistency 
with Mill’s own judgments, the further up the modal ladder of rank 
the (allegedly) lower quality pleasure of a given pair is located. That 
said, exactly how prone will depend upon an answer to a question that 
may be important for future research, namely, that of how Mill’s indi-
vidual comparisons of pairs of modes of existence are supposed to relate 
to each other. For example, is the qualitative superiority between the 
pleasure in the mode of existence of the instructed person and that of 
the ignoramus supposed to hold when the latter is also a person of feel-
ing and conscience (supposing Mill takes that to be possible)?25 Ceteris 
paribus, an answer in the affirmative would make the Lexical Interpre-
tation far less radical, and thus far less prone to generating ‘extreme’ 
results, than an answer in the negative.
Nevertheless, it is far from clear that the Lexical Interpretation 
can contain the danger when Mill’s qualitative judgments are taken 
into consideration.26 In an intriguing letter to Thomas Hare written in 
1865, Mill reports how reading Plato in Avignone, while staying there 
with his wife, is not quickening his “zeal” in his “own cause, as a candi-
date” for parliament:
25 Consider (XVIII: 31; XIX: 390, 402).
26 For one attempt at containment, resting on further interpretive claims the 
plausibility of which it is not possible to examine here, see Riley (2009: 131–3).
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It is an infinitely pleasanter mode of spending May to read the Gorgias and 
Theatetus under the avenue of mulberries which you know of, surrounded 
by roses and nightingales, than it would be to listen to tiresome speaking for 
half the night in the House of Commons. The only disagreeable thing here is 
having to choose between pleasures. (XVI: 1061, emphasis added)
Perhaps Mill is simply exaggerating here but, given the shortage of 
textual evidence with any potential to confirm the truth of the Lexical 
Interpretation (Schmidt-Petri 2006), it would be difficult for its advo-
cates to dismiss the passage in this way, as opposed to taking it as the 
confirmation that Mill views qualitative differences between pleasures 
in terms of an infinite—or unbridgeable—gap in the value of their 
pleasantness.27 However, while advocates of B-Necessity may think 
that even the Lifetime Interpretation will generate an uncharitably 
‘extreme’ implication in this case, the Lexical Interpretation is clearly 
in greater danger of doing so. After all, could Mill really be implying 
that, ceteris paribus, no number of lifetimes worth of the pleasures he 
could take in his parliamentary mode could bear more final value than 
the pleasures he could derive from a month in his philosophical mode 
with his wife at Avignone (cf. Parfit 2004: 18)?28
Of course, ultimately interpretations of Mill’s qualitative hedonism 
also require evaluation in terms of whether, or how far, they can be 
made to cohere with his moral judgments. This can only be done with 
the aid of bridging principles predicated on specific interpretations of 
Mill’s utility principle, on the one hand, and his theory of justice and 
rights, on the other. Since those interpretations will be highly contested 
(Cooper et al 1979; Lyons 1997), we should be careful to avoid jumping 
to simplistic conclusions about the moral implications that would flow 
from Mill’s hedonism as such given the adoption of one interpretation 
thereof as opposed to another (Skorupski 2000: 259–60). At the same 
time, the examples above should make clear that there is at least the 
potential for the choice between the Lifetime and Lexical Interpreta-
tion to have a significant impact upon how far Mill’s utilitarianism is 
taken to imply that differences in beings’ modes of existence can gener-
ate differences in their moral status, and thus the attractiveness of his 
position for contemporary philosophers interested in population ethics 
as such.29
27 For example, Riley’s interpretation is that “any higher kind is infinitely more 
pleasant than any lower kind” (2009: 128).
28 Here it may be worth noting a couple of other interpretive possibilities worth 
exploring: (1) that the size of the value gap is due to the fact that Mill is actually 
comparing a mode with a mere activity (this may be congenial to advocates of 
B-Necessity who take Mill to allow for some relations of qualitative superiority to 
rise to the level of lexical dominance (cf. Miller 2010: 56; see also Beaumont 2019: 
571–5)); and (2) that the description of the parliamentary mode (or activity) as 
‘tiresome’ implies that it is actually best conceived as a pain (this may be congenial 
to advocates of the Lexical Interpretation who want to limit its ‘extremeness’).
29 I would like to thank Christoph Schmidt-Petri and Dale Miller for comments 
on and criticisms of an earlier version of this paper, as well as the two anonymous 
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